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INTRODUCTION
In 1953, Justice Frankfurter urged the Supreme Court “to
lay down as specifically as the nature of the problem permits
the standards or directions that should govern the District
Judges in the disposition of applications for habeas corpus by
prisoners under sentence of State courts.”1 In the decades
since, the Court has failed to heed to Justice Frankfurter’s
admonition to give lower federal courts clear guidance on the
† B.A., 2013 Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 2016 Cornell Law School; Articles Editor, Cornell Law Review. I would like to thank Professor Keir Weyble for
his continued support throughout the note writing process and his infinite knowledge on the subject of this Note.
1
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 501–02 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(expressing the view of the majority).
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resolution of habeas petitions. Indeed, the precise individualized enforcement that Justice Frankfurter warned against2 has
materialized.3 Specifically, as habeas litigation has become
more complex and different procedural circumstances have
emerged, the circuit courts have adopted different standards to
review Strickland claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.4
To make matters worse, differences have arguably emerged
even among panels within the same circuit.5 The resulting
confusion is mostly due to the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),6 which instructs that a federal
habeas court may not grant habeas relief if the prisoner’s claim
has been “adjudicated on the merits” in state court unless the
claim meets one of two narrow exceptions.7 As one circuit
judge lamented about the confusion that has arisen, since
AEDPA’s enactment in 1996 “no law has so vexed the United
States Court of Appeals.”8
To prevail on a Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, a defendant must show (1) deficient performance, that
is, that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment” and (2) prejudice, that is, “that counsel’s
2

Id. at 501.
See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Court is creating a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary,
and unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of federal rights . . . .”).
4
Compare Collins v. Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 545–46 (3d
Cir. 2014) (“Section 2254(d) deference applies to any claim that has been adjudicated on the merits in any state court proceeding, which ‘can occur at any level of
state court’ as long as the state court’s resolution has preclusive effect.” (citations
omitted)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 454 (2014), with Thomas v. Clements, 789 F.3d
760, 766 (7th Cir. 2015), reh’g denied, 797 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that
only the “last reasoned opinion on the claim” is entitled to AEDPA deference).
5
Compare Thomas, 789 F.3d at 766 (citation and internal quotation mark
omitted) (holding that only the “last reasoned opinion on the claim” is entitled to
AEDPA deference), with Atkins v. Zenk, 667 F.3d 939, 944 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Because both prongs have been addressed by Indiana state courts, in one form or
another, the deferential standard of review set out in § 2254(d) applies to both.”).
6
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
7
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in
a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Id.
8
Garrus v. Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 694 F.3d 394, 412 (3d Cir. 2012)
(Hardiman, J., dissenting).
3
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errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial.”9 Though the Strickland test has two prongs,10 an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be resolved by deciding
only one prong against the petitioner.11 As one might expect,
state courts generally follow the Supreme Court’s advice in
Strickland not to “grade counsel’s performance,” and instead
dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on
lack of prejudice.12 Issues arise, however, when a state appellate court’s decision that addresses the merits of only one
prong reaches the federal courts, and the federal court must
decide whether to address the unreviewed prong de novo or
with AEDPA deference. More specifically, when a lower state
court has addressed the prong left unreviewed by the appellate
court, the circuits have reached different conclusions on
whether federal courts must “look[ ] through”13 the appellate
court’s silence, that is, examine the reasons given by a lower
state court decision discussing that prong, or whether they
must review that prong de novo.14
The Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Wiggins v. Smith
suggests that federal habeas courts should not “look through”
state appellate court silence on a prong to a lower state court
decision.15 In Wiggins, the Court examined the prejudice
prong of a prisoner’s Strickland claim de novo because the state
court disposed of the post-conviction petition by finding no
deficient performance.16 However, after the Court’s decision in
9

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Id.
11
Id. at 697 (“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to . . . address both components of the [Strickland] inquiry if the
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”).
12
Id.; see Thomas v. Clements, 789 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2015), reh’g
denied, 797 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that in collateral proceedings, the
state appellate court denied petitioner’s claim based upon lack of prejudice and
did not decide whether counsel’s performance was deficient).
13
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991) (explaining that the lookthrough methodology is a presumption where unexplained orders are given no
effect and the reviewing court “simply ‘looks through’ them to the last reasoned
decision”).
14
Compare Collins v. Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 545–46 (3d
Cir. 2014) (“Section 2254(d) deference applies to any claim that has been adjudicated on the merits in any state court proceeding, which can occur at any level of
state court as long as the state court’s resolution has preclusive effect” (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 454 (2014), with
Thomas, 789 F.3d at 766 (only the “last reasoned opinion on the claim” is entitled
to AEDPA deference).
15
539 U.S. 510, 527–31 (2003).
16
See id. at 534.
10
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Harrington v. Richter,17 some courts18 and jurists19 have suggested that Wiggins no longer controls. In Richter, the Court
determined that a state appellate court is entitled to AEDPA
deference when it chooses to remain silent on a claim by summarily denying a habeas petition.20 Recently, courts have
agreed that if a lower state court decision does discuss the
merits of a prisoner’s claim, the federal habeas court can “look
through” a summary denial—complete silence on a claim—to
the last reasoned opinion on the claim,21 as the court instructed in its pre-Richter decision, Ylst v. Nunnemaker.22 As
Judge Easterbrook urged in his concurrence in the denial of
rehearing en banc for Thomas v. Clements, where the Seventh
Circuit held that federal courts are to examine only the last
reasoned opinion on the claim, and therefore review an unexamined Strickland prong de novo,23 the Supreme Court should
revisit Wiggins in a post-Richter world.24 The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits join the Seventh in refusing to “look through”
silence on a prong,25 but the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
“look through” appellate court silence on a prong to a lower
state court decision.26
17

562 U.S. 86 (2011).
See, e.g., Collins, 742 F.3d at 545–46 (explaining that § 2254(d) deference
will apply to any claim adjudicated on the merits, regardless of state court level).
19
See Thomas, 797 F.3d 445, 446 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc) (discussing how the Supreme Court adopted a “look-pastsilence” approach).
20
562 U.S. at 92.
21
See, e.g., Hittson v. Chatman, 135 S. Ct. 2126, 2127 (2015) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the denial of certiorari) (discussing how courts should look through
to the last reasoned decision when last state court issues an unexplained order).
22
501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) (“Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment
or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.”).
23
789 F.3d 760, 767 (7th Cir. 2015), reh’g denied, 797 F.3d 445 (7th Cir.
2015).
24
See Thomas, 797 F.3d at 448 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc).
25
See, e.g., Rayner v. Mills, 685 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2012) (“When a state
court relied only on one Strickland prong to adjudicate an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, AEDPA deference does not apply to review of the Strickland prong
not relied upon by the state court. The unadjudicated prong is reviewed de
novo.”); Johnson v. Sec’y, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 929–30 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining
that “[a]s a result of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on the performance
prong and non-decision on the prejudice prong, we review the holding that counsel’s performance was not deficient with AEDPA deference, but we must conduct a
plenary review of whether Johnson was prejudiced” even though the post-conviction court “found a lack of prejudice”).
26
See, e.g., Sessoms v. Grounds, 776 F.3d 615, 620 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015)
(explaining that the court considered the California Court of Appeal’s opinion
because it was the “‘last reasoned opinion’ in this matter for purposes of AEDPA”);
18
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I agree with Judge Easterbrook that Wiggins in a postRichter world is a subject that “belongs on the Supreme Court’s
plate,”27 but disagree that Wiggins does not survive Richter. In
his concurrence in the denial of a rehearing en banc in Thomas,
Judge Easterbrook explains his disapproval of the two legal
rules that are triggered by the Seventh Circuit approach: (1)
“the proposition that the opinion of every state court except the
last must be ignored” and (2) “that performance and prejudice,
the two components of an ineffective-assistance claim under
Strickland, are separate ‘claims’ for the purpose of § 2254(d).”28
Judge Easterbrook also explained that the practice followed in
Wiggins, reviewing an unexamined prong de novo, was just a
“drive-by statement[ ]” and therefore has no precedential
value.29 Below I defend the two legal rules that underlie the
Seventh Circuit approach and explain why Wiggins survives
Richter. Unlike Judge Easterbrook, I believe the Seventh Circuit approach “strike[s] an honest balance between respecting
the prerogatives of the state courts while ensuring that every
habeas petitioner has an actual and meaningful opportunity to
seek redress for constitutional violations.”30
I
BACKGROUND
The writ of habeas corpus allows a prisoner to challenge
the legality of his or her detention.31 It is a civil post-conviction
complaint.32 The Constitution does not directly provide for the
writ, and the Supreme Court has never held that the writ is a
constitutional right.33 However, since 1789, the writ has been
Woodfox v. Cain, 772 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that the court would
use the “look through” doctrine); Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231–32 (3d
Cir. 2009) (noting that “in considering a § 2254 petition, we review the ‘last reasoned decision’ of the state courts on the petitioner’s claims”).
27
Thomas, 797 F.3d at 446 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
28
Id. at 447.
29
See id. at 448.
30
Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 982 (11th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct.
1452 (2013), aff’d, 736 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2013).
31
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 91 (2011) (“The writ of habeas corpus
stands as a safeguard against imprisonment of those held in violation of the
law.”); Artemio Rivera, The Consideration of Factual Issues in Extradition Habeas,
83 U. CIN. L. REV. 809, 811–12 (2015).
32
Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL.
L. REV. 443, 447 (2007).
33
Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review
Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1080–81 (1995).
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codified by federal statutory law.34 Since then, the scope of the
right to habeas relief has been interpreted inconsistently as the
nation’s political climate35 and the composition of the Supreme
Court36 have changed. At times, the Court has interpreted a
prisoner’s right to habeas relief broadly, emphasizing the importance of reviewing state court convictions.37 More recently,
however, the Court has reasoned that comity, finality, and federalism require federal courts to grant habeas relief only in very
narrow circumstances.38 Under this view, habeas relief serves
to guard against “only [the most] extreme malfunctions in the
state criminal justice systems,”39 and should not be treated as
“a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.”40
Determining the proper scope of the writ is particularly important because it dictates the amount of deference federal habeas
courts should give to state court convictions.
A. The Modern Era
“Most trace the genesis of the modern habeas regime to
Brown v. Allen,”41 decided by the Supreme Court in 1953. In
Brown, the Court interpreted the scope of the writ relatively
broadly.42 Justice Frankfurter attempted to “lay down as specifically as the nature of the problem permits”43 the standard of
review for habeas petitions by instructing federal courts to con34

Id.
For example, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh
sparked public interest in limiting prisoners’ ability to delay execution through
post-conviction remedies, and Congress subsequently enacted the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act. See Judith L. Ritter, The Voice of Reason—Why
Recent Judicial Interpretations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act’s Restrictions on Habeas Are Wrong, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2013).
36
See Joshua D. Smith, Comment, Habeas Corpus: Expired Conviction, Expired Relief: Can the Writ of Habeas Corpus Be Used to Test the Constitutionality of
a Deportation Based on an Expired Conviction?, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 59, 67–79 (2005)
(discussing how the Court’s view of habeas corpus has changed over the years);
see also Forsythe, supra note 33, at 1135–44 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
transition from a narrow scope to a more expanded scope of federal habeas corpus
between 1885 and 1963).
37
See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311–12 (1963) (“Thus a narrow
view of the hearing power would totally subvert Congress’ specific aim . . . of
affording state prisoners a forum in the federal trial courts for the determination
of claims of detention in violation of the Constitution.”).
38
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000).
39
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
40
Id. at 102–03.
41
Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 447.
42
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 500 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(“[P]rior State determination of a claim under the United States Constitution cannot foreclose consideration of such a claim . . . .”).
43
Id. at 501–02.
35

R

R
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duct a step-by-step analysis of habeas petitions.44 He explained that had Congress wanted to leave the resolution of
habeas petitions to the state courts, it could and would have
done so.45 Instead, however, Congress chose to provide prisoners with a federal forum for review of federal constitutional
challenges to their detention.46 Justice Frankfurter concluded
that it is precisely the “command” of federal judges to decide
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, so those
questions should be reviewed de novo in federal court.47
In the years after Brown, the Supreme Court continued to
construe the writ broadly and to instruct federal courts to give
little difference to state court decisions. For example, in Fay v.
Noia, the Court held that a federal habeas court could hear a
prisoner’s procedurally defaulted claim, that is, one that was
not presented in the state courts, so long as the prisoner did
not “deliberately by-pass[ ]” the state system.48 However, these
decisions spurred much judicial, academic, and legislative criticism.49 Shortly after pronouncing the death penalty constitutional in Gregg v. Georgia in 1976,50 the Court, led first by Chief
Justice Burger and then by Chief Justice Rehnquist, quickly
adjusted and determined that the scope of a federal court’s
power to grant habeas relief should actually be quite narrow.51
B. AEDPA
After a few decades watching the Court restrict the ability
of federal courts to review state court convictions, Congress
finally mustered the votes to pass legislation52 that either imposed obstacles to habeas relief or fortified obstacles already
44

Id. at 502–07.
Id. at 499.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 506.
48
372 U.S. 391, 389–99, 438 (1963); see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 322 (1963) (discussing how a medical experts’ failure to testify is not an
“inexcusable default”); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17 (1963) (explaining
that even with a prior application for federal collateral relief, the new application
must be fully considered unless there has been an abuse of writ or motion
remedy).
49
John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259,
265 (2006).
50
428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
51
Blume, supra note 49, at 265–66; see also Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 448
(noting that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts “created or strengthened” obstacles
to habeas relief in response to the Warren Court’s “aggressive use of the writ as a
vehicle to reform criminal procedure”).
52
Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 447–48.
45

R

R
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put in place by the Court.53 Congress was able to do so “[j]ust
as legislative efforts to restrict the writ’s availability were approaching futility.”54 The impetus for action was the trial, conviction, and death sentence of Timothy McVeigh for the 1995
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City.55 McVeigh became “the poster child for the federal death
penalty”56 and public response to the bombing “made it hazardous for legislators to oppose”57 proposed laws that would
provide a more “[e]ffective” death penalty.58 It did not hurt that
in 1994, Republicans seized control of Congress.59 Accordingly, on April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act,60 and “[g]one were the years of
waiting to carry out executions.”61 Timothy McVeigh became
the first federal death row inmate to be executed since 1963.62
But AEDPA had lofty objectives beyond McVeigh. AEDPA
“intended . . . to end the flood of habeas petitions filed in federal
court”63 and further principles of “comity, finality, and federalism.”64 It meant to “incorporate[ ] reforms to curb the abuse of
the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to address the acute
problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases.”65
Through AEDPA, then, Congress made clear that federal courts
53

Id. at 448–49.
Id. at 462.
55
Ritter, supra note 35, at 58; see also United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d
1166, 1176, 1179 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussing the facts of the McVeigh bombing).
56
Rory K. Little, What Federal Prosecutors Really Think: The Puzzle of Statistical Race Disparity Versus Specific Guilt, and the Specter of Timothy McVeigh, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1591, 1604 (2004).
57
Greg Doty, Federal Habeas Behind Bars: Preserving Evidentiary Review
After Cullen v. Pinholster and Harrington v. Richter, 81 UMKC L. REV. 207, 213
(2012); see also Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 447 (noting that “few legislators dared
oppose” AEDPA).
58
Erik Degrate, I’m Innocent: Can a California Innocence Project Help Exonerate Me? . . . Not If the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) Has Its
Way, 34 W. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 77–78 (2006); see also Ritter, supra note 35, at 58
(“Many believed that Congress transformed AEDPA from a long-debated reform to
reality in response to the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
in Oklahoma City . . . .”).
59
Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 462–63.
60
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
61
Blume, supra note 49, at 259.
62
Degrate, supra note 58, at 78.
63
Meredith Regan, Comment, Lies, Damn Lies, and White Ink: The Convenient
Fiction of Adjudication on the Merits in Murdock v. Castro, 52 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP.
135, 135 (2011).
64
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000).
65
Emily Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The
Post-AEDPA Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in
Federal Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1219, 1228 (2012) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54

R

R

R

R
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would no longer review state court decisions de novo,66 as the
Court held in Brown,67 but instead that state court decisions
would be entitled to a heightened level of deference in federal
court.68 Perhaps the most important change that AEDPA made
was “fundamentally alter[ing]”69 federal habeas review for prisoners in state custody by modifying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to
impose a “substantive limit”70 on review. Section 2254(d) now
reads:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision
that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.71

In sum, under § 2254(d), no federal court can grant habeas
relief on a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” in state
court unless the federal court determines that the state court’s
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts.”72
C. The Aftermath of AEDPA
Proponents and critics of AEDPA either hoped or feared
that it would require federal courts to give so much deference to
state court decisions that a prisoner would have virtually no
opportunity for federal review of their habeas claim.73 However, in its wake, scholars observed that AEDPA did not have as
66

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 500 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
68
Regan, supra note 63, at 135.
69
Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 93 (2012).
70
See Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 449.
71
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
72
Id.
73
See Blume, supra note 49, at 260; see also Krista A. Dolan, The §2254
Trinity: How the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Richter, Pinholster, and Greene
Have Interpreted Federal Review Into Near Nonexistence, 8 CRIM. L. BRIEF 49, 49
(2013) (describing recent Supreme Court cases that have effectively tipped the
scales “in favor of no review”).
67

R

R
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profound an effect as many thought that it would.74 For example, from its enactment in 1996 to 2005, AEPDA had no effect
on the percentage of habeas cases under § 2254(d) in which the
petitioner was successful in the Supreme Court.75 With respect to Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the
Supreme Court actually granted relief in several Strickland
cases, which it had not done before AEDPA.76 While the Supreme Court did confirm that after AEDPA, § 2254(d) now mandated a more deferential standard of review than the de novo
standard it applied in Brown, it took a more modest approach
than most expected,77 which led leading habeas scholars to
report that AEDPA was “largely a ‘symbolic’ statute that made
only trivial or ‘marginal changes’ to the already existing judicially created limitations on relief.”78
However, the tide began to change in the new millennium;
the Supreme Court began to take a more activist approach to
AEDPA cases. Specifically, from 2000 to 2012, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in ninety-four AEDPA cases, about
half of which dealt with questions of federal habeas courts’
deference to state court decisions.79 Though “[a] well-drafted
statute should reduce the frequency of disputes about interpretation,” AEDPA certainly did not do so.80 In seventy-four
percent of the cases in which the Court granted certiorari, it
reversed the court of appeals decision for failing to give adequate difference to the state court decision.81 “Remarkably,”
almost fifty percent were reversed without dissent.82
Perhaps the ease with which the Court was first able to
conclude that AEDPA did not change the § 2254(d) landscape
and shortly after conclude that it actually did significantly restrain federal courts’ ability to grant habeas relief is due to the
74
Blume, supra note 49, at 276; see also Dolan, supra note 73, at 49 (noting
that the Court’s initial interpretation of AEDPA ran contrary to congressional
intent).
75
Blume, supra note 49, at 277 (explaining that before AEDPA, the Court
granted relief in 33% of cases, compared to 34% after the enactment of AEDPA).
76
Marceau, supra note 69, at 96.
77
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 377, 412 (2000).
78
Marceau, supra note 69, at 108–09 (citations omitted).
79
Garrus v. Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 694 F.3d 394, 412–13 (3d Cir.
2012).
80
Benjamin R. Orye III, Note, The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus Reform,
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a Judgment of Conviction Becomes Final for the Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1), 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 441, 470 (2002) (citations omitted).
81
Garrus, 694 F.3d at 413.
82
Id. at 413–14
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fact that AEDPA was “hastily ratified and poorly cohered.”83
Indeed, even the Supreme Court Justices have expressed frustration with the drafting of AEDPA. For example, in Lindh v.
Murphy, Justice Souter, writing for the majority, remarked,
“[a]ll we can say is that in a world of silk purses and pigs’ ears,
the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting.”84
Similarly, Justice Scalia asked during oral argument in another AEDPA case, “Who is responsible for writing this?”85 In
addition to its poor drafting, which even its proponents have
acknowledged,86 the statute is particularly difficult to interpret
because “evidence of AEDPA’s purpose is unusually sparse.”87
Nevertheless, in 2011, the Supreme Court sought to interpret the “adjudicated on the merits” language in § 2254(d) in
Harrington v. Richter.88 In Richter, the Court determined that
an unreasoned state court opinion,89 that is, a petition for state
post-conviction relief that is denied without an accompanying
statement of reasons or a written opinion, is “an adjudic[ation]
on the merits” for § 2254(d) purposes.90 In Richter and other
cases decided in the same year,91 it became “abundantly
clear”92 to scholars and practitioners that “AEDPA’s practical
bite is even more ferocious than the initial legislative bark may
have suggested.”93 Specifically, as one study found, from
AEDPA’s enactment to 2007, less than four-tenths of one percent of habeas petitioners in state custody received any kind of
relief in the federal district courts.94
It is clear, though, that Richter raised more questions than
it answered. For example, because in Richter no lower state
court had addressed the merits of the prisoner’s claim,95 in a
post-Richter world, lower federal courts have struggled with
83

Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 447.
521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
85
Blume, supra note 49, at 261 (citations omitted).
86
Orye, supra note 80, at 470.
87
Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 469.
88
562 U.S. 86 (2011).
89
Id. at 98.
90
Id.
91
See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181–82 (2011) (limiting federal review to the record that was before the state trial court).
92
Dolan, supra note 73, at 49.
93
Marceau, supra note 69, at 88; see also Dolan, supra note 73, at 50 (explaining that relief in AEDPA cases declined steadily from AEDPA’s enactment
through 2011. Specifically, from 1996 to 2000, 50% of AEDPA petitioners obtained relief, but from 2010 to 2011, that figure dropped to 14%).
94
Andrew L. Adler, The Non-Waivability of AEDPA Deference’s Applicability,
67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 767, 771 (2013) (citing Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King,
Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, at WK8).
95
Richter, 562 U.S. at 100.
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whether they are able to “look through” a summary denial and
scrutinize a lower state court’s reasons for rejecting a prisoner’s claim or, alternatively, whether they are required to determine whether “‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the
correctness of the state court’s decision”96 in a vacuum, as the
Court instructed in Richter. There was,97 and still is to some
extent,98 a circuit split on this question. However, Justice
Ginsburg’s concurrence in the denial of certiorari in Hittson v.
Chatman in June 2015 seemed to confirm that, at least in her
view, federal courts are to “look through” a summary denial to
the reasons given by a lower state court for rejecting a prisoner’s claim.99 Under Ylst,100 she explained, federal courts are
to presume that later unexplained orders upholding a judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground,
since unexplained orders usually reflect agreement with the
reasons given by the lower court.101 In a post-Richter world,
though, should silence on a Strickland prong be treated the
same as silence on a claim?
II
ANALYSIS
In Thomas v. Clements, the Seventh Circuit held that silence on a prong should be treated differently than silence on a
claim; that federal habeas courts should not “look through” an
appellate court’s silence on a Strickland prong to a lower state
court’s discussion of that prong.102 The Seventh Circuit denied
a rehearing en banc of this issue, and Judge Easterbrook wrote
a concurrence in the denial.103 In that concurrence, Judge
Easterbrook explained that there are two rules that underlie
the Seventh Circuit’s decision: (1) that a federal court can only
96

Id. at 101 (citations omitted).
Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 493.
98
Compare Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 774 F.3d 671, 678
(11th Cir. 2014) (“Instead of deferring to the reasoning of the state trial court, we
ask whether there was any ‘reasonable basis for the [Supreme Court of Georgia] to
deny relief.’”) (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 98), with Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d
1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the suggestion that it should “evaluate all
the hypothetical reasons that could have supported the high court’s decision” as
an “overly broad reading of Richter”).
99
135 S. Ct. 2126, 2127 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari).
100
501 U.S. 797 (1991).
101
Hittson, 135 S. Ct. at 2127 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari).
102
789 F.3d 760, 767–68 (7th Cir. 2015).
103
Thomas v. Clements, 797 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
97

R
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look to one state court decision, and (2) that a prong of a Strickland claim is a “claim” for § 2254(d) purposes.104 He explains
that both of these rules are unsound, and that the Wiggins
practice of reviewing an unexamined prong was an “unreasoned statement” that would be unwise to follow.105 Below, I
first explain the majority opinion in Thomas and Judge Easterbrook’s concurrence in the denial of the rehearing en banc. I
then defend these two rules that underlie the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion and explain why the Wiggins holding is indeed a holding, and why it survives Richter.
A. Thomas v. Clements
In June 2015, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court’s denial of Oscar Thomas’s habeas petition in Thomas v.
Clements.106 In state court proceedings, Thomas was convicted
for the murder of his ex-wife, Joyce Oliver-Thomas.107 Though
they were divorced, Thomas and Oliver-Thomas lived together.108 They also fought.109 On December 27, 2006, sometime around 2 a.m., a neighbor awoke to screaming, choking,
and kicks and thumps on the ceiling.110 Thomas called the
police at 3:24 a.m. reporting that Oliver-Thomas was unconscious. She was pronounced dead at the hospital less than an
hour later.111 During Thomas’s trial, the state’s forensic
pathologist testified that Oliver-Thomas’s autopsy report was
consistent with the application of intentional pressure to her
neck, resulting in her death.112 A coroner and medical examiner also testified that Oliver-Thomas had hemorrhages in her
eyes, at least ten abrasions on her face, multiple hemorrhages
inside her neck, and bruises on her thyroid and larynx.113 She
concluded that Oliver-Thomas’s death was not an accident, but
the result of manual strangulation and physical assault.114
On state post-conviction review, Thomas claimed that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert testimony reviewing or countering the coroner’s findings.115 Dur104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 447.
Id. at 448.
Thomas, 789 F.3d at 763.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 764.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 765.
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ing post-conviction proceedings, Thomas presented the
testimony of a forensic pathologist who explained that certain
injuries indicative of strangulation were absent from OliverThomas’s body, and that there was no physical evidence of
intentional pressure to Oliver-Thomas’s neck.116 Trial counsel
said that he did not consider retaining a forensic pathologist.117 The post-conviction court found that Thomas failed
both prongs of the Strickland analysis and denied relief.118 The
state appellate court affirmed, finding no prejudice, but did not
address whether counsel’s performance was deficient.119
1. The Seventh Circuit Opinion
On federal habeas, the parties disagreed about whether the
court was required to give AEDPA deference to the performance
prong of Thomas’s Strickland claim since the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals did not address that prong.120 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that even though the lower state court determined
that Thomas did not satisfy either prong, because the appellate
court did not decide whether counsel’s performance was deficient, the Seventh Circuit was required to review the performance prong de novo.121 Although the State argued that the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Atkins v. Zenk122 foreclosed the
possibility of reviewing the performance prong de novo,123 the
court nonetheless explained that circuit and Supreme Court
precedent, as well as the plain language of AEDPA, mandated
the court’s de novo review.124
In addressing circuit precedent, the Seventh Circuit said
that its decision in Atkins did not contradict Thomas.125 In
Atkins, the trial court addressed both Strickland prongs and
the appellate court only addressed one.126 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit stated that “[b]ecause both prongs have been addressed by Indiana state courts, in one form or another, the
deferential standard of review set out in § 2254(d) applies to
both.”127 In Thomas, however, the Seventh Circuit disagreed
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 767.
667 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2012).
Thomas, 789 F.3d at 766.
Id. at 766–67.
Id. at 766.
Atkins, 667 F.3d at 943.
Id. at 944.
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with the State that Atkins controlled, because in Atkins, “the
standard of review was not subject to debate between the parties.”128 It also explained that the Seventh Circuit practice is to
give deference only to the “last reasoned opinion on the claim,”
not an amalgamation of decisions.129 In Woolley v. Rednour,
for example, the Seventh Circuit articulated that “[u]nless a
state-court opinion adopts or incorporates the reasoning of a
prior opinion, ‘AEDPA generally requires federal courts to review one state decision.’”130 Because in Woolley “the appellate
court declined to adopt the trial court’s reasoning and instead
remained silent on defense counsel’s performance,” the Seventh Circuit reviewed that prong de novo.131
The court also defended its holding by asserting that
Supreme Court precedent and the plain language of AEDPA
supported de novo review.132 First, the Seventh Circuit noted
Supreme Court support for this rule with one citation to Wiggins and Ylst.133 It then went on to say that AEDPA instructs
courts to give deference to “the adjudication.”134 If Congress
had meant to instruct federal courts to give deference to more
than one decision by “looking through” the appellate court’s
opinion, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, it would have referenced
adjudications, plural.135 The exceptions to § 2254(d) also refer
to a “decision” that is either contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, or is
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.136
“Again, the statute refers to a single decision, rather than multiple decisions.”137 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, reviewed
the performance prong de novo, and concluded that trial counsel’s performance was indeed deficient.138 Further, because
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard to
the prejudice prong, the Seventh Circuit also reviewed that
prong de novo.139
128

Thomas, 789 F.3d at 766.
Id. (quoting Woolley v. Rednour, 702 F.3d 411, 421 (7th Cir. 2012)).
130
Woolley, 702 F.3d at 421 (quoting Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093
(9th Cir. 2005)).
131
Thomas, 789 F.3d at 766 (quoting Woolley, 702 F.3d at 422).
132
Id. at 767.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 771.
139
Id. at 763.
129
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2. The Denial of Rehearing En Banc
On August 7, 2015, the Seventh Circuit denied a rehearing
en banc of Thomas.140 In his concurrence of the denial, Judge
Easterbrook effectively wrote a petition for a writ of certiorari.
He disagreed with the panel’s decision that “if two state courts
consider a subject, with Court A denying relief on one ground
and Court B on a different ground, then a federal court must
ignore the first decision.”141 Nonetheless, Easterbrook wrote,
“there is little point in granting rehearing en banc to move this
circuit from one side of a conflict to another.”142 Instead, “[t]he
subject belongs on the Supreme Court’s plate.”143 He expressed his disagreement with the two legal rules that are triggered by, and underlie, the panel’s decision: (1) “the
proposition that the opinion of every state court except the last
must be ignored” and (2) “that performance and prejudice, the
two components of an ineffective-assistance claim under Strickland, are separate ‘claims’ for the purpose of § 2254(d).”144
Judge Easterbrook also explained that the practice followed in
Wiggins, Rompilla, and Porter, that is, reviewing an unexamined prong de novo, were just “drive-by statements” in those
cases and therefore have no precedential value.145 I take each
one of these arguments in turn.
B. Why Federal Courts Must Look to One, and Only One,
State Court Opinion
In 1991 in Ylst v. Nunnemaker,146 the Court explained that
“where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a
federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same
ground.”147 In Richter, the Court confronted a situation where
no state court had issued a reasoned opinion on the prisoner’s
claim,148 so it did not have an opportunity to determine
whether it should “look through” the summary denial to the
reasons given by a lower state court and, under Ylst, assume
that the “later unexplained orders . . . rest upon the same
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

797 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 445 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
Id. at 446.
Id.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 448.
501 U.S. 797 (1991).
Id. at 803.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88 (2011).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN504.txt

unknown

Seq: 17

24-JUN-16

2016] WHY SILENCE SHOULDN’T SPEAK SO LOUDLY

15:58

1337

ground.”149 However, in a post-Richter world, it has become
clear that Ylst applies to summary denials and that federal
habeas courts can “look through” summary denials to the reasons that a lower state court has given for rejecting a prisoner’s
claim.150
It is not clear, however, that this is the result the Richter
court intended or even anticipated. In Richter, the Court was
focused on the situation where there is no written opinion.151
The Court’s holding in Richter was that “[w]here a state court’s
decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing” that no “‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state
court’s decision.”152 It instructed petitioners, and also lower
federal courts, to engage in a hypothetical analysis of the arguments or theories that could have supported the state court’s
decision, even though the state court did not provide any arguments or theories.153
This hypothetical analysis proved “very difficult, if not impossible.”154 As an initial matter, it is not the job of a federal
court “to invent arguments in support of upholding a state
court’s unexplained decision.”155 Instead, that is “the job of a
state’s attorney general.”156 More to the point, however, it simply makes no sense to follow the Court’s instruction in Richter
to determine what arguments or theories could have supported
the summary denial157 if the actual arguments or theories that
supported the state court’s decision are readily ascertainable.
Therefore, in the years following Richter, circuit courts started
looking to the reasons given by lower state courts, and cited
Ylst for the Supreme Court’s endorsement of this approach.158
In June 2015, Justice Ginsburg expressed her agreement with
this practice in the denial of certiorari in Hittson v. Chattman,
149

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803.
Hittson v. Chatman, 135 S. Ct. 2126, 2127 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
151
Richter, 562 U.S. at 98.
152
Id. at 88, 101 (citations omitted).
153
Id. at 88.
154
Claudia Wilner, “We Would Not Defer to That Which Did Not Exist:” AEDPA
Meets the Silent State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442, 1457 (2002).
155
Id. at 1468.
156
Id.
157
Richter, 562 U.S. at 88.
158
See, e.g., Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 291–92 (6th Cir. 2010) (“In
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, the Supreme Court applied a presumption that ‘[w]here there
has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained
orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same
ground.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)).
150
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explaining that “Richter’s hypothetical inquiry was necessary”
when “no state court opinion explain[ed] the reasons relief ha[d]
been denied.”159 She admonished the Eleventh Circuit for “discarding Ylst.”160
In the Wiggins situation, however, where a federal court
reviews an unexamined prong de novo, there is no need for the
Ylst rule. In Ylst, the Court said that “[t]he maxim is that
silence implies consent . . . and courts generally behave accordingly, affirming without further discussion when they agree,
not when they disagree, with the reasons given below.”161 But
in the Wiggins situation, where a state court is silent on a
prong discussed and decided by the lower court, it has affirmed
a lower state court decision explicitly with further discussion.
It would be inappropriate in that situation “to presume the
state court not only had a finding in mind as to the unexplained prong but that this finding was against the petitioner”162 because the higher court must have disagreed, at
least in part, with the lower court’s reasoning. Otherwise, it
would have taken the quickest way home and affirmed the
lower court’s decision on the same prong.
Further, many state court opinions explicitly announce
their refusal to consider a Strickland prong163 and the federal
habeas court should give meaning to these statements. For
example, where a state court says, “we do not address whether
Trial Counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”164 a federal court cannot logically claim that the
court nonetheless adjudicated the performance prong of the
159
Hittson v. Chatman, 135 S. Ct. 2126, 2127 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (alterations in original) (citation
omitted).
160
Id.
161
Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804.
162
Rayner v. Mills, 685 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2012).
163
See, e.g., People v. Newmiller, 338 P.3d 459, 469 (Colo. App. 2014) (“Because defendant has not established deficient performance, we do not address
prejudice.”); Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 828 (Del. 2013) (“Even if it was assumed
that Trial Counsel’s failure to present . . . evidence fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness, . . . [the defendant] cannot show that Trial Counsel’s alleged
deficiencies prejudiced him . . . . Because we hold that . . . [the defendant] has
failed to establish prejudice under Strickland, we do not address whether Trial
Counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”); In re
Pers. Restraint of Crace, 280 P.3d 1102, 1108–09 (Wash. 2012) (“We need not
consider both prongs of Strickland (deficient performance and prejudice) if a petitioner fails on one . . . . Assuming without deciding that counsel was deficient . . . we cannot say in all reasonable probability that counsel’s error—failure
to seek the lesser included offense—contributed to . . . [the defendant’s] conviction
on attempted second degree assault.”).
164
Ploof, 75 A.3d at 828.
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prisoner’s Strickland claim. It would be even more illogical to
conclude that the state court not only adjudicated that prong,
but also that it adjudicated the prong against the petitioner.165
That practice would “essentially ascrib[e] a conclusion to the
state court that the state court declined to make itself,”166 and
provide no principled reason for refusing to apply the rule when
the higher state court not only implicitly rejects the holding of
the lower court by choosing to adjudicate the claim on the
other prong, but also when it expressly rejects the lower court’s
reasoning. Under the Easterbrook approach, in these situations, federal courts would still look to the lower state court’s
reasons for rejecting the prisoner’s claim on the performance
prong, for example, even when the appellate court explicitly
denounces and disapproves of the lower court’s reasoning on
that prong.167
Ylst also instructs federal courts to look to one, and only
one, state court decision. The Ylst court repeatedly referenced
“the last explained state-court judgment”168 and “the last reasoned opinion.”169 It even announced that the analysis “begin[s] by asking which is the last explained state-court
judgment.”170 In Ylst, the Court did not gather as many state
court judgments as it could to piece together one adjudication.
Piecing together an “adjudication on the merits” would also
contradict “the core purpose of [the Ylst] rule[, which] is to
improve ‘administrability’ and ‘accuracy’ amongst the lower
federal courts.”171 Therefore, federal habeas courts should not
be required to apply AEDPA deference to “some amalgamation
of multiple state court decisions”172 because it would sometimes require the court to dig deep into the record.
165
Of course, this is the approach encouraged by Strickland itself. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding
an ineffective assistance claim to . . . address both components of the [Strickland]
inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”).
166
Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 10, Wolfenbarger v. Foster, 133 S. Ct.
1580 (2013) (No. 12-420).
167
Compare Loden v. McCarty, 778 F.3d 484, 495 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Where a
lower state court ruled on an element that a higher state court did not, the lower
state court’s decision is entitled to AEDPA deference.”), with White v. Thaler, 610
F.3d 890, 907 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[B]ecause the state court did not adjudicate the
first prong on the merits, we review the deficient performance prong of Strickland
de novo and the prejudice prong under the more deferential AEDPA standard.”).
168
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805 (1991).
169
Id. at 803.
170
Id. at 805.
171
Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 786 F.3d 450, 463 (6th Cir. 2015).
172
Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005).
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C. Why it is Permissible to Treat Prongs of a Strickland
Claim as “Claims” for § 2254(d) Purposes
Judge Easterbrook is correct that Wiggins seems to stand
in conflict with AEDPA. Under AEDPA, § 2254(d) tells us that a
federal court cannot grant habeas relief to a state prisoner
“with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim”
was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law
or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts.173 It seems that if a state court
decision is deemed an “adjudication on the merits,” AEDPA
deference should apply to the entire “adjudication.” On the
other hand, if a state court does not reach an “adjudication on
the merits,” the entire claim should be reviewed de novo.
Under Wiggins, though, the §§ 2254(d)(1) and 2254(d)(2) exceptions only apply to the prong that the state court actually
reached, and only that prong is deemed an “adjudication on the
merits.”174 However, this is the conclusion that follows directly
from Wiggins. Treating a prong as a “claim” for § 2254(d) purposes does not at all flow from the Thomas problem, or Wiggins
in a post-Richter world. It is a necessary consequence of Wiggins itself.
Also, Judge Easterbook overlooks the fact that his approach, too, requires an element-specific analysis of Strickland
claims under § 2254(d). It is not just Wiggins and the Thomas
decision that “tacitly equate[ ] [an] ‘issue’ with [a] ‘claim.’”175
Applying AEDPA deference to each prong of a prisoner’s Strickland claim in different state court decisions is also elementspecific because it gives deference to different decisions based
on the element of the Strickland claim that that decision examines. It necessarily treats a prong of the Strickland analysis as
an essential component of the adjudication of the Strickland
claim, just like the Seventh Circuit approach. Some circuits
that follow Judge Easterbrook’s approach have acknowledged
that this approach conflates a Strickland prong with a “claim”
for § 2254(d) purposes. For example, in Loden v. McCarty, the
Fifth Circuit said, “[w]here a lower state court ruled on an element that a higher state court did not, the lower state court’s
decision is entitled to AEDPA deference.”176
173

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 530–31 (2003).
175
Thomas v. Clements, 797 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
176
778 F.3d 484, 495 (5th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
174
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Last, treating a prong as a “claim” for § 2254(d) purposes
comports with Congress’ intent in passing AEDPA because it
allows federal courts to defer only to what the state court actually decided, and also allows a prisoner one full opportunity to
have his or her claim heard and decided. Requiring a federal
court to give deference “to any claim that has been adjudicated
on the merits in any state court proceeding which can occur at
any level of state court”177 does not give proper “[r]espect for the
state judiciary,”178 but rather gives undue deference to state
court decisions. The heart of § 2254(d) compels federal courts
to give deference to state court decisions where the state court
has engaged in an analysis of the “intrinsic rights and wrongs
of a [claim].”179 If the state court has done so with one prong of
the Strickland analysis, but not the other, it should not matter
whether the claim can be deemed “adjudicated on the merits.”
Rather, what is important for AEDPA purposes, is applying
deference to the prong that the state court actually decided.
Though it is clear that AEDPA was intended to “limit the
scope of federal intrusion into state” court decisions180 and to
curb habeas abuse,181 Congress also sought to maintain
“meaningful federal court oversight” of state court convictions,
particularly those that deal with federal law.182 Congress
sought to maintain the “longstanding practice” of federal courts
protecting prisoners’ federal constitutional rights—at least to
some degree—where a state court fails to do so.183 Of course,
through AEDPA, Congress sought to “adjust the balance between state and federal courts,” but that does not mean it
intended to “strip prisoners of their right to meaningful review
of their federal constitutional claims.”184

177
Collins v. Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 545 (3d Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
178
Thomas, 797 F.3d at 446 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
179
Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1097 (2013) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
180
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000).
181
Anne R. Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and
Federal Habeas Corpus, 68 MD. L. REV. 545, 597 (2009).
182
Wilner, supra note 154, at 1459.
183
Id.
184
Id.

R
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D. Why the Wiggins Holding is not a “Drive-By
Statement”185
In Wiggins, the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that
counsel’s performance was not deficient, and therefore did not
reach the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis.186 In evaluating the prisoner’s habeas petition, the Supreme Court first
determined that the Maryland Supreme Court unreasonably
applied Strickland in finding that counsel’s performance was
not deficient.187 The Court explained that even though the
state court acknowledged that counsel’s performance “did not
meet the minimum standards of the profession,” it nevertheless
did not conduct a further investigation.188 Thus, the Court
concluded, the state court unreasonably applied Strickland’s
deficient performance prong under § 2254(d).189 The Court reviewed the prejudice prong de novo, reasoning that its “review
is not circumscribed by a state court conclusion with respect to
prejudice, as neither of the state courts below reached [the
prejudice] prong of the Strickland analysis.”190
Contrary to what Judge Easterbrook argues, reviewing the
prejudice prong of the prisoner’s Strickland claim de novo in
Wiggins was not an “unreasoned” or “drive-by statement.”191 It
was a practice the Court followed; the application of the rule
that when a state court does not address a prong of the Strickland analysis, that prong is reviewed de novo. Further evidence
that this practice is not an “unreasoned statement” lies in the
Court’s insistence on obeying this rule. For example, in 2005
in Rompilla v. Beard, the Court repeated and again followed
this rule, saying that “[b]ecause the state courts found the
representation adequate, they never reached the issue of
prejudice, and so we examine this element of the Strickland
claim de novo.”192 In Porter v. McCollum, four years later, the

185
Thomas v. Clements, 797 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
186
See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 518 (2003).
187
Id. at 527.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 534.
191
Thomas v. Clements, 797 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
192
545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005) (citations omitted).
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Court also followed the Wiggins rule,193 and many lower federal
courts have since done the same without much hesitation.194
The Supreme Court in Wiggins carried out the steps it
thought necessary to resolve an issue under AEDPA. Those
steps are models for lower courts to follow. The rule simply
cannot be: do as the Supreme Court explicitly says, and not as
it does. That would deprive parties and lower federal courts of
the guidance they have relied upon for centuries. Following the
practice that the Court followed in Wiggins, Rompilla, and
Porter is hardly “treat[ing] as a holding everything the Supreme
Court ever said on the way to any decision.”195 Judge Easterbrook tells us that because “[n]one of the petitions in Wiggins,
Rompilla, and Porter presented the question whether ‘issue’ is
the same as ‘claim’ under § 2254(d),” and “[n]one of the briefs
in any of these cases devotes an argument to that subject,” we
cannot think of the Wiggins practice as a holding.196 However,
it cannot be that lower courts cannot follow a Supreme Court
practice unless it is the question presented in the parties’
briefs. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that federal courts are
to look to Supreme Court practice, and not just its narrow
holdings, in Andrews v. Davis,197 where it said that “[i]n determining whether a state court’s adjudication of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable application of
Supreme Court precedent, we may consider how the Supreme
Court itself has applied Strickland to other factual contexts,”198
which is “illustrative of the proper application of [Strickland’s]
standards.”199
E. Why Wiggins and Richter Operate in Different Spheres
Nothing in Richter changes the Wiggins rule. Richter applies only “[w]here a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by
193
558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (“Because the state court did not decide whether
Porter’s counsel was deficient, we review this element of Porter’s Strickland claim
de novo.”).
194
See, e.g., Rayner v. Mills, 685 F.3d 631, 637–38 (6th Cir. 2012) (“In at least
two published opinions—one of which was decided en banc—where the state
court adjudicated only one prong, we have continued to rely on Wiggins and have
reviewed the remaining prong de novo. These decisions did not examine the
interplay between Wiggins and Harrington . . . . [and] Fifth and Ninth Circuit cases
have, like our own, continued to follow Wiggins or Rompilla without discussion.”
(citations omitted)).
195
Thomas, 797 F.3d at 448 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
196
Id.
197
798 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 2015).
198
Id. at 774–75.
199
Id. at 775 (alteration in original).
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an explanation.”200 In Wiggins-type cases, the state court decision is accompanied by an explanation, but just fails to address one prong of the prisoner’s Strickland claim. In Richterlike cases, the reasons that the state court denied a prisoner’s
Strickland claim are not readily ascertainable. A federal habeas
court cannot tell whether the state court adjudicated the performance prong or the prejudice prong or both. Richter tells us
that we assume the court adjudicated both prongs and gives
AEDPA deference to both prongs. However, in Wiggins-like
cases, the state court discusses just one prong and is silent on
the other. In that situation, we need not assume that it also
decided the other prong (in part because state courts often
explicitly say that they have not reached a particular prong).201
We also cannot assume that in Richter, the Court overruled sub
silentio its holding in Wiggins.202 The Richter Court cited both
Wiggins and Rompilla without suggesting that its decision
would call the Wiggins holding, or its practice of reviewing an
unexamined prong de novo, into doubt. While Richter applies
to silence on a claim, Wiggins applies to silence on a prong.
“This is a straightforward approach that allows those Supreme
Court decisions to co-exist comfortably.”203
But even if Richter did apply, it would not produce the
outcome urged by Judge Easterbrook. In Richter, the Court
said that silence on a claim is to be deemed an “adjudication on
the merits.”204 It follows from Ylst that when a lower state
court has adjudicated the claim, a federal habeas court can
“look through” the state appellate court’s silence to the reasons
given by the lower court and defer to those reasons.205 However, under Richter, when no state court has discussed the
merits of the prisoner’s claim, the federal habeas court still
must accord deference to the state court’s decision.206 In those
situations, the federal court is to determine what arguments or
theories could have supported the summary denial, and then
ask if fair-minded jurists could disagree about those argu200

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).
See, e.g., People v. Newmiller, 338 P.3d 459, 469 (Colo. App. 2014) (“Because defendant has not established deficient performance, we do not address
prejudice.”).
202
See Sussman v. Jenkins, 642 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2011).
203
Rayner v. Mills, 685 F.3d 631, 639 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
204
Richter, 562 U.S. at 98 (“Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied
by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing
there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”).
205
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991).
206
See Richter, 562 U.S. at 98.
201
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ments or theories.207 If Richter is wholly imported to a situation where a state appellate court has discussed just one prong
of the prisoner’s Strickland claim, then, when no state court
has issued a reasoned decision on the prong, the federal court
would have to determine “what arguments or theories supported, or could have supported . . . [the denial of the prisoner’s
claim on that prong], and then . . . ask whether it is possible
fair-minded jurists could disagree” about those arguments or
theories.208
However, this is not the conclusion that the circuits that
follow Judge Easterbrook’s approach reach. Instead, where no
state court has discussed the merits of a prong of a Strickland
claim, the circuit courts that follow Judge Easterbrook’s rule
look to Wiggins for guidance and review the prong de novo.209
But Richter either applies to silence on a prong or it does not. It
cannot apply only where the state courts have, at one stage or
another, discussed both prongs but not where no state court
has examined one of the prongs.
CONCLUSION
A case where Wiggins would require a federal court to review a prong of a petitioner’s Strickland claim de novo is rare. A
federal court reviewing a Strickland claim should conduct a
step-by-step analysis of the prisoner’s claim and the state
court’s adjudication of that claim. In most cases, federal courts
would not reach the last step, that is, conducting the de novo
review of one prong of a prisoner’s Strickland claim. First, the
federal courts should begin by examining the last reasoned
opinion.210 Under Richter and Ylst, if the state appellate court
issued a summary denial, then the habeas court would “look
through” that decision to the lower state court decision.211
Next, the federal court would determine whether the “last
reasoned opinion”212 adjudicated one or both of the prongs. If
207

Id. at 102.
Id.
209
Compare Loden v. McCarty, 778 F.3d 484, 495 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Where a
lower state court ruled on an element that a higher state court did not, the lower
state court’s decision is entitled to AEDPA deference.”), with White v. Thaler, 610
F.3d 890, 907 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[B]ecause the state court did not adjudicate the
first prong on the merits, we review the deficient performance prong of Strickland
de novo and the prejudice prong under the more deferential AEDPA standard.”).
210
Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805 (explaining that the analysis “begin[s] by asking
which is the last explained state-court judgment”).
211
See Hittson v. Chatman, 135 S. Ct. 2126, 2127 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
212
Thomas v. Clements, 789 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2015).
208
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it adjudicated both prongs, both prongs would receive AEDPA
deference. If it adjudicated just one prong, the federal court
would begin by applying AEDPA deference to that prong. If the
federal court, applying AEDPA deference to that prong agrees
with the state court, the inquiry is over and the petition is
denied. Strickland itself encourages any court adjudicating a
Strickland claim to dispose of the prisoner’s claim in the easiest
way possible.213 Only then if the federal court determines that
the state court unreasonably applied federal law or unreasonably determined the facts on one prong would it review the other
prong de novo.
Further, it may seem as though reviewing an unexamined
prong de novo yet reviewing silence with full AEPDA adjudication is backwards. After all, the rule does require federal courts
to defer to a “state-court decision that contains no analysis
whatsoever on either component of a Strickland claim” but not
to a “partially-reasoned state-court decision.”214 However,
what distinguishes full AEDPA deference versus de novo review
on one prong is not the amount of analysis a state court performs.215 Instead, the assessment concerns whether a state
court addressed one or both prongs of Strickland. Second, giving more deference to a silent decision than one that speaks is
not the result of following Wiggins in a post-Richter world, it is
the result of Richter itself. Under Richter, a state court decision
is given the most deference when no state court has discussed
the merits of the petitioner’s claim. In those cases, a federal
habeas court must determine what arguments or theories
could have supported the summary denial, and then ask if fairminded jurists could disagree about those arguments or theories.216 Arguably, this is the most heightened level of deference
a federal habeas court could possibly accord to a state court
decision.
The Wiggins rule also does not require much of state courts
in order to be granted a level of deference that severely limits
the scope of federal review. Applying Wiggins actually encour213
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (“Although we have
discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness claim prior to the
prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on
one.”).
214
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Wolfenbarger v. Foster, 133 S. Ct. 1580
(2013) (No. 12-420).
215
Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 13, Wolfenbarger v. Foster, 133 S. Ct.
1580 (2013) (No. 12-420).
216
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).
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ages state appellate courts to write summary denials, which
furthers Richter’s goal of “enabl[ing] a state judiciary to concentrate its resources on the cases where opinions are most
needed.”217 A state appellate court need only write one word,
“denied,” to receive AEDPA deference on both Strickland
prongs.218 Alternatively, if the court wishes to speak, it can
express its agreement with the lower court’s decision on the
prejudice prong, for example, and then go on to discuss deficient performance.
As Judge Easterbrook urged in his concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc in Thomas v. Clements, “the Supreme
Court ought to revisit” Wiggins in the post-Richter world.219
However, I disagree with Judge Easterbrook that Richter’s holding is so broad that it changes the Wiggins rule. The Supreme
Court has reached what should be the limit of restricting
habeas review, and the time has come to instead limit the
Richter holding and “lay down as specifically as the nature of
the problem permits the standards or directions that should
govern the District Judges in the disposition of applications for
habeas corpus by prisoners under sentence of State courts.”220
It is no longer enough to justify limiting the availability of
habeas relief because, as the Third Circuit explained, it comports with “the United States Supreme Court’s repeated admonitions that AEDPA mandates broad deference to the decisions
of the state courts.”221 Because “life and liberty depend on
such review,”222 prisoners deserve one fair opportunity to litigate not just their claim, but both prongs of their Strickland
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

217

Id. at 99.
Id. at 98 (“Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no
reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”).
219
See Thomas v. Clements 797 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
220
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 501–02 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
221
Collins v. Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 546 n.12 (3d Cir.
2014).
222
Wilner, supra note 154, at 1474.
218

R
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